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In  the  late  1970s  the  money  stock  was  growing 
at a faster  rate  than  desired,  the  rate  of inflation  was 
accelerating,  and  the  dollar  was steadily  depreciating 
in  the  foreign  exchange  markets.  In  an  attempt  to 
reverse  these  developments  the  Federal  Reserve  on 
October  6,  1979 announced  several  actions,  including 
a change  in its  operating  procedures  to  place  more 
emphasis  on  managing  the  growth  of bank  reserves 
in  order  to  improve  monetary  control.1  The  new 
procedures  are  generally  thought  to  have  remained 
in place  until October  9,  1982, when Federal  Reserve 
Chairman  Paul Volcker  announced  that  the  Fed  was 
going  to  temporarily  place  less  emphasis  on  the 
money  stock  (M1)  in its policy  decisions.  The  period 
between  October  1979  and  October  1982  was 
characterized  by  unusually  high  and  volatile  short- 
term  interest  rates,  volatile  money  growth  rates, 
and-towards  the  end  of  the  period-a  sharp  drop 
in the  rate  of inflation.  Many  accounts  of this  period 
have  attributed  these  developments  to  the  new 
procedures. 
The  issue  addressed  in this paper  is how  the  Fed’s 
operating  procedures  actually  changed  in  October 
1979  and,  more  specifically,  how  movements  in the 
federal  funds  rate  were  determined.2  Before  October 
1979,  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee  (FOMC) 
at each  meeting  set  an initial target  for the  funds  rate 
and gave a set of instructions  to the  Account  Manager 
at  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  (the 
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1 For an  account  of  the  developments  leading  up  to  the 
change  in  operating  procedures,  see  “Fed  Takes  Strong  Steps 
to  Restrain  Inflation,  Shifts  Monetary  Tactic,”  The Wall  Street 
Journal,  October  8,  1979,  p.  1. 
2 The federal  funds  rate  is the  rate  on overnight  loans  of reserves 
between  depository  institutions.  Changes  in the  funds  rate  are 
important  because  they  generally  lead  to changes  in other  short- 
term  interest  rates. 
“Desk”)  on  how  to  adjust  the  funds  rate  over  the 
period  until  the  next  FOMC  meeting.  These  instruc- 
tions  related  desired  movements  in  the  funds  rate 
to the  projected  growth  rates  of M1  and M2  (relative 
to  the  short-run  tolerance  ranges  specified  by  the 
FOMC)  and  to  other  factors  such  as  inflation, 
economic  activity  and  the  behavior  of  the  dollar  in 
the  foreign  exchange  markets.  Each  week  the  Desk 
reset  the  target  for  the  funds  rate  based  on  the 
behavior  of these  variables  and the  latest  instructions 
it  had  received  from  the  FOMC. 
The  Fed  stopped  setting  explicit  targets  for  the 
funds  rate  after  October  6,  1979,  and  a widely  held 
view  is that  funds  rate  movements  over  the  follow- 
ing  three  years  were  determined  by  market  forces 
rather  than  by  the  Fed.3  According  to  this  view, 
the  critical  aspect  of  the  new  procedures  was  that 
the  Fed  fixed  the  supply  of  nonborrowed  reserves 
available  to  depository  institutions  so that  increases 
in the  money  stock  and  hence  in the  demand  for re- 
quired  reserves  would  automatically  cause  increases 
in  the  funds  rate  and  other  short-term  rates.  (The 
mechanism  by  which  this  occurred  is  described 
below.) 
Despite  the  widespread  emphasis  on the  automatic 
adjustment  in descriptions  of the  post-October  1979 
operating  procedures,  it was  well-recognized  at the 
time  that  movements  in  the  funds  rate  under  the 
procedures  could  also result  from  purely  judgmental 
actions  of  the  Federal  Reserve.  These  actions 
included  (1) judgmental  adjustments  to  the  supply 
of  nonborrowed  reserves  in  the  period  between 
FOMC  meetings,  (2) judgmental  adjustments  initi- 
ated  at  an  FOMC  meeting,  (3)  changes  in  the  dis- 
count  rate,  and  (4) changes  in the  surcharge  that  at 
3  For  example,  see  Stigum  [1983,  p.  369]:  “At  that  time,  the 
Fed  decreed  that  the  rate  at  which  funds  traded  would  be 
wherever  market  forces  took  it, which  turned  out  to  be  all over 
the  lot:”  and  Morris  [1983.  p.5]:  “The  new  policy  regime  initi- 
ated  in  October  1979  was  unique,  not  in  that  we  established 
money  growth  targets,  but  that  we  sought  to  achieve  them  by 
managing  the  rate  of growth  of  bank  reserves,  allowing  short- 
term  rates  to  be  largely  market  determined.” 
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count  rate  and  applied  to  large  banks.4 
This  paper  evaluates  whether  funds  rate  move- 
ments  from  October  1979  to  October  1982  were 
determined  by market  forces  interacting  with  a non- 
borrowed  reserve  rule or largely  on a judgmental  basis 
by the  Federal  Reserve  as in other  periods.  To  make 
this  evaluation,  the  paper  presents  a  detailed 
breakdown  and  analysis  of the  policy  actions  affect- 
ing the  funds  rate  in this period.  I conclude  that  while 
some  of  the  movement  in  the  funds  rate  over  this 
period  resulted  from  the  automatic  adjustment,  most 
of  the  movement-roughly  two-thirds-was  due  to 
judgmental  actions  of  the  Federal  Reserve. 
Analytical  Framework 
Increases  in  the  federal  funds  rate  in  the  period 
from  October  1979  through  October  1982  came 
about  in two  general  ways.  The  first  was through  an 
increase  in  the  amount  of  reserves  that  banks  had 
to  borrow  at the  discount  window  (i.e.,  the  amount 
not supplied  by  the  Fed  in  the  form  of  nonbor- 
rowed  reserves),  hereafter  called  the  “borrowed 
reserves  target."5 The  demand  by banks  for borrowed 
reserves  depends  positively  on  the  spread  between 
the  federal  funds  rate  and  the  discount  rate. 
Therefore,  in  general,  the  larger  the  amount  of 
reserves  banks  had  to  borrow  at  the  discount 
window,  the  greater  the  spread  between  the  funds 
rate  and  the  discount  rate  necessary  to induce  them 
to  borrow  these  reserves.  Consequently,  at a given 
discount  rate  an increase  in the  amount  of reserves 
4  It  should  be  emphasized  that  most  Federal  Reserve  descrip- 
tions  of  the  operating  procedures  in  this  period  did  not  claim 
that  funds  rate  movements  were  being  determined  solely  by the 
automatic  adjustment.  Levin  and  Meek  [1981],  Volcker  [1980], 
and  the  New  York Federal  Reserve  Bank’s  reviews  of monetary 
policy  and  open  market  operations  [1980,  1981,  1982,  1983) 
all describe  the  effects  on  the  funds  rate  of judgmental  adjust- 
ments  to  the  supply  of  nonborrowed  reserves  and  changes  in 
the  discount  rate  and  surcharge. 
5 The  term  generally  used  in  this  period  to  denote  the  initial 
borrowing  level  specified  by  the  FOMC  for  an  intermeeting 
period  was  the  “borrowed  reserve  assumption.”  This  term  was 
used  because-as  will  be  explained  later  in  the  article-under 
the  procedures  the  amount  of  reserves  that  banks  had  to  bor- 
row  in  the  period  between  FOMC  meetings  depended  on  the 
growth  rate  of money,  which  was  unknown  at the  beginning  of 
the  period.  Hence,  the  initial  borrowing  level  changed  as  the 
period  developed.  The  borrowing  level  specified  for a particular 
week  within  the  intermeeting  period  was in effect  a target  because 
under  the  prevailing  system  of  lagged  reserve  requirements  a 
target  for  nonborrowed  reserves  implied  a specific  level  of bor- 
rowed  reserves.  To  simplify  the  discussion  and  the  presenta- 
tion  of the  data.  I use  “target”  for both  purposes.  As will be  clear 
in  the  text,  the  use  of  that  term  is  not  meant  to  suggest  that 
the  borrowing  level  initially  specified  by  the  FOMC  was  fixed 
throughout  the  intermeeting  period. 
banks  had  to borrow  resulted  in a higher  funds  rate. 
Increases  in the  funds  rate  in this period  also resulted 
from  increases  in the  basic  discount  rate  or the  sur- 
charge.  The  funds  rate  had  to  rise  following  an  in- 
crease  in the  discount  rate  in order  to  maintain  the 
spread  between  the  two  rates  necessary  to  achieve 
the  borrowed  reserve  target  in  the  current  week. 
The  approach  taken  in  this  paper  is  to  track 
changes  in the  borrowed  reserve  target,  the  discount 
rate,  and  the  surcharge  from  October  1979  to 
October  1982  and  to  estimate  how  much  of  the 
resulting  movement  in the  funds  rate  was attributable 
to  the  automatic  adjustment  and  how  much  to 
judgmental  actions  by the  Fed.  The  basic  analytical 
procedure  is  to  construct  a  series  of  tables  which 
document  the  timing  and cause  of changes  in the bor- 
rowed  reserve  target  as well as the  timing  of changes 
in  the  discount  rate  and  the  surcharge.  Table  I 
illustrates  the  procedure  with  data  for  the  period 
beginning  after  the  March  31,  1981  FOMC  meeting 
and ending  May  20,  1981,  the  day following  the  next 
FOMC  meeting.  Over  this period  the  funds  rate  rose 
3.96  percentage  points.  Similar  tables  for each  of the 
intermeeting  periods  from  October  1979  to October 
1982  are in a working  paper  [Cook,  1989].  (A com- 
pact  version  of  these  tables  is  provided  in  the 
Appendix.)  All  information  in  Table  I  is  from  the 
weekly  Report  of Open  Market  Operations  prepared 
by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York.  The 
explanatory  notes  in the  table  are  direct  quotes  from 
the  Report. 
This  section  of the  paper  works  through  Table I 
to identify  how  much  of the  change  in the  borrowed 
reserve  target  in the  intermeeting  period  ending  May 
20,  1981  resulted  from  the  automatic  adjustment  and 
how  much  resulted  from  judgmental  actions  taken 
by  the  Federal  Reserve.  This  information  is  used 
together  with  the  changes  in the  discount  rate  and 
surcharge  documented  in  Table  I  to  estimate  the 
amount  of  the  change  in  the  funds  rate  in  this  in- 
termeeting  period  resulting  from  the  automatic  ad- 
justment  and  the  amount  resulting  from  judgmental 
actions  by  the  Fed.  The  following  section  of  the 
paper  provides  similar  estimates  for  the  full  period 
from  October  1979  to  October  1982. 
The  initial  borrowed  reserve  target  In  the  post- 
October  1979 period  the  Federal  Open  Market  Com- 
mittee  at  each  meeting  chose  an  initial  target  for 
borrowed  reserves  for the  period  until the  subsequent 
meeting.  This  target,  which  was  generally  called 
the  “borrowed  reserve  assumption,”  is  shown  in 
column  3 of Table  I.  As  noted  above,  the  demand 
by  banks  to borrow  reserves  at the  discount  window 
largely  depends  on  the  spread  between  the  federal 
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BEHAVIOR  OF SORROWED  RESERVES,  THE DISCOUNT  RATE,  AND  THE FUNDS  RATE 
IN THE  INTERMEETING  PERIOD  ENDING  MAY  20,  1981 
a  M1B  is  for  the  impact  of  account  shifts. 
A  review  technical  factors  the  potential  modest  downward  to  the  paths.  However,  the  volatility  the  data  the  modest  of  the  changes,  no 
were  made. 
A  review  technical  factors  sizable  potential  adjustments  to  [total  and  nonborrowed]  path.  effect  of  these  adjustments  have  raised  projected  borrowing 
to  as  as $2.8  In  order  smooth  the  between  reserve  it  was  to  leave  reserve  paths  the  first  unchanged. 
d  the  size  this  [total  gap,  a  was  made.  consultation  with  Chairman,  to  the  average  reserve  path  to  the  reserve  path  $250  million 
It  appeared  midweek  that  at  the  window  would  exceed  the  anticipated  in  path  construction.  have  met  nonborrowed  reserve  would  have 
to  dilute  effects  of  discount  rate 
f  1)  was  decided,  consultation  with  Chairman,  to  the  average  reserve  path  another  $120  in  response  the  overrun  total  reserves. 
Finally,  also  consultation  with  Chairman,  it  decided  to  the  average  reserve  path  because  of  $343  million  in  nonborrowed  in  the  week  of  subperiod  Consequently, 
average  nonborrowed  path  for  three-week  period  lowered  by  additional  $114  ($343  ÷ funds  rate  and  the  discount  rate.  Hence,  in  choos- 
ing an initial target  for borrowed  reserves  the  FOMC 
was indirectly  setting  an initial level  for the  funds  rate 
in the  intermeeting  period.  (Of course,  this funds  rate 
level  also depended  on  the  prevailing  discount  rate.) 
At  its  March  31,  1981  meeting,  the  FOMC  set  an 
initial  target  for  borrowed  reserves  for  the  inter- 
meeting  period  ending  May  20,  1981  of  $1150 
million.  This  figure was only  slightly below  the  $1162 
million  borrowing  target  in  the  last  week  of  the 
previous  intermeeting  period. 
The  automatic  adjustment  in  the  borrowed  reserve 
target6  At each  meeting  the  FOMC  also set  short- 
run  targets  for  M1  and  M2  over  a period  of  two  to 
four  months.  These  targets  are  shown  in column  1 
of Table  I, and the  most  recent  projections  of money 
growth  are shown  in column  2.7 The  staff constructed 
a “path”  for total  reserves  consistent  with  the  money 
supply  targets.  In constructing  the  total  reserve  path, 
the  staff  allowed  for  the  projected  mix  of  currency 
and  deposits  and the  projected  demand  by banks  for 
excess  reserves,  and  it took  into  account  the  reserve 
requirements  for  various  categories  of  deposits.  In 
practice,  many  of  the  non-M1  components  of  M2 
were  nonreservable  and  reserves  on  other  com- 
ponents  were  being  phased  out  under  the  Monetary 
Control  Act.  As a result,  the  total  reserve  path  was 
determined  primarily  by  the  M1  target. 
The  staff  also  constructed  a  path  for  nonbor- 
rowed  reserves  by  subtracting  the  FOMC’s  initial 
target  for  borrowed  reserves  from  the  total  reserve 
path.  The  paths  for  total  and  nonborrowed  reserves 
were  then  translated  into  reserve  levels  covering  the 
shorter  periods  between  FOMC  meetings.  The 
System  Account  Manager  (the “Desk”)  was instructed 
to  conduct  open  market  operations  in  the  inter- 
meeting  period  in a manner  consistent  with  achiev- 
ing  the  nonborrowed  reserve  path. 
The  central  feature  of the  procedures  was  that  as 
the  intermeeting  period  progressed,  the  path  for 
6 This  brief  description  of  the  automatic  adjustment  is  taken 
primarily  from  Volcker  [1980].  For  additional  detail  see  Levin 
and  Meek  [1981] and  the  annual  reports  on  monetary  policy  and 
open  market  operations  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New 
York  [1980,  1981,  1982,  1983].  Hetzel  [1986]  provides  a 
chronological  review  of the  implementation  of the  post-October 
1979  procedures,  and  Goodfriend  et  al.  [1986]  provide  a 
weekly  rational  expectations  model  of  the  procedures.  Other 
discussions  of the  procedures  are in Hetzel  [1982],  Poole  [1982], 
and  Spindt  and  Tarhan  [1987]. 
7 The  projections  of the  monthly  growth  rates  of the  monetary 
aggregates  shown  in Table  I are  those  made  by  the  staff  of the 
Board  of Governors.  If projections  for  a particular  month  were 
supplied  by  the  New  York  staff  but  not  the  Board  staff,  then 
the  New  York  staff’s  forecasts  are  shown  in  the  table. 
nonborrowed  reserves  was  to  be  held  fixed.  If,  for 
example,  the  projected  growth  rate  of money  in the 
intermeeting  period  rose  above  the  target  set  by the 
FOMC,  then  the  projected  level  of  total  reserves 
would  rise above  the  path  level  of total  reserves.  With 
the  nonborrowed  reserve  path  held  fixed,  the  emerg- 
ing gap between  the projected  and path  levels  of total 
reserves  due  to  the  stronger-than-targeted  money 
growth  would  cause  an  increase  in  the  amount  of 
reserves  that  had  to  be  borrowed  at  the  discount 
window.  The  funds  rate  would  rise  in  the  current 
week  until  the  spread  between  it  and  the  discount 
rate  was large  enough  to  induce  banks  in the  aggre- 
gate  to borrow  these  additional  reserves.  The  result 
was that  stronger-than-targeted  money  growth  would 
automatically  cause  a rise  in  the  funds  rate,  which 
was supposed  to bring  money  growth  back  to  target: 
over  time. 
In practice,  the  Desk  made  two  modifications  to 
the  automatic  adjustment  as described  above.  First, 
although  the  Desk  held  the  average nonborrowed 
reserve  path  fixed  when  there  was an increase  in the 
projected  demand  for  total  reserves  in  the  inter- 
meeting  period,  it  typically  made  offsetting  adjust- 
ments  to  the  weekly  nonborrowed  reserve  path  in 
order  to maintain  steady  borrowing  over  the  remain-, 
ing weeks  of the  period  (Levin  and Meek  [1981,  pp. 
7-8)].  Suppose,  for  example,  that  in  the  middle  of 
a six-week  intermeeting  period  new  information  in- 
creased  the  projected  demand  for  total  reserves  by 
an average  of $300  million  over  the  remaining  three 
weeks  of  the  period,  consisting  of  $100  million  in 
week  4,  $300  million  in week  5,  and  $500  million 
in week  6.  In  this  situation  the  Desk  would  reduce 
the  nonborrowed  reserve  path  by  $200  million  in 
week  4,  leave  it unchanged  in week  5,  and  raise  it 
by  $200  million  in week  6.  The  result  would  be  to 
raise  the  borrowed  reserve  target  for  each  of  the 
remaining  three  weeks  in  the  period  by  an  equal 
amount  of  $300  million. 
The  second  modification  to the  automatic  adjust- 
ment  described  above  was  that  the  Desk  made 
“technical”  adjustments  to the paths  for total  and non- 
borrowed  reserves  to  allow  for  changes  in  the 
estimates  of  excess  reserves  and  required  reserves 
against  deposits  not  included  in M1  and  M2.  Sup- 
pose,  for  instance,  that  in  the  intermeeting  period 
the  demand  for  total  reserves  unexpectedly  rose  by 
$50  million  due  to an increase  in the  demand  for ex- 
cess  reserves  and  by  $50  million  due  to  an increase 
in  required  reserves  against  bank  liabilities  not  in- 
cluded  in M1  or M2.  If the  Desk  made  no allowance 
for these  factors,  the  necessary  discount-window  bor- 
rowing  by  banks  would  rise  by  $100  million.  The 
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rate  even  though  there  had  been  no  increase  in the 
projected  growth  of M1  or M2.  To  forestall  this  out- 
come,  the  Desk  could  raise  the  total  and  nonbor- 
rowed  reserve  paths  by  $100  million. 
In  the  Report  of  Open  Market  Operations,  the 
Desk  reported  a gap between  the  projected  and path 
level  of total  reserves  as an average  over  all the  weeks 
in  the  intermeeting  period.  In  the  above  example, 
where  the  projected  demand  for  total  reserves  rose 
by  $100  million,  $300  million,  and  $500  million  in 
the  last  three  weeks  of  a  six-week  intermeeting 
period,  the  Desk  would  have  raised  the  gap by $150 
million  [(100  +  300  +  500)/6].  The  Desk  divided 
fifteen  of the  twenty-six  intermeeting  periods  into two 
subperiods,  including  the  period  shown  in Table  I. 
In these  cases  the  reserve  averages  were  calculated 
separately  for  each  subperiod. 
Column  4 in Table  I shows  the  gap  between  the 
average  projected  and  path  levels  of  total  reserves 
for  the  intermeeting  period  ending  May  20,  1981.8 
As the  period  developed,  the  stronger-than-targeted 
money  growth  raised  the  projected  level  of  total 
reserves.  The  positive  gap between  the  projected  and 
path  levels  of total  reserves  that  normally  would  have 
resulted  from  the  stronger-than-targeted  money 
growth  did not appear  at the end  of the first subperiod 
(April 29)  because,  in order  to smooth  the  transition 
between  the  two  subperiods,  the  Desk  decided  not 
to  make  any  of  the  sizable  potential  downward 
technical  adjustments  to the  total  and  nonborrowed 
reserve  paths  (note  c  in  Table  I).9  These  adjust- 
8 In practice,  the  initial gap between  the  projected  and path  levels 
of total  reserves  at the  time  of the  FOMC  meeting  was set  equal 
to  zero,  although  the  gap  could  change  in the  first  week  of the 
intermeeting  period  if  on  the  Friday  following  the  FOMC 
meeting  (usually  on  Tuesday)  the  staff’s  forecasts  for  the 
monetary  aggregates  differed  from  those  made  at the  meeting. 
Setting  the  initial  reserve  gap  equal  to  zero  did  not  constrain 
the  FOMC,  since  if the  FOMC  wished  to  engineer  a change 
in  the  funds  rate  at  the  time  of  the  meeting,  it could  do  so  by 
changing  the  borrowed  reserve  target  from  recent  borrowing 
levels. 
9 The  sense  in which  the  transition  between  the  two  subperiods 
was  “smoothed”  by  this  decision  is  as  follows.  In  the  first 
three  weeks  of  the  first  subperiod,  the  actual  borrowing  level 
(column  8)  ran  below  the  borrowing  target  for  the  remaining 
weeks  in  the  subperiod  (column  7)-henceforth  called  the 
“weekly”  target  (discussed  later  in this  section).  Because  of these 
past  misses,  the  weekly  target  had to rise steadily  as the  subperiod 
progressed  in  order  to  achieve  the  average  borrowed  reserve 
target.  The  Desk  did  not  make  any  of the  downward  technical 
adjustments  to  the  reserve  paths  at  the  end  of  the  first  sub- 
period-which  would  have  caused  a rise  in the  revised  average 
and  hence  weekly  borrowed  reserve  targets-because  the  weekly 
target  had  already  risen  sharply.  If  the  Desk  had  made  the 
technical  adjustments,  the  weekly  target  would  have  climbed 
more  than  it did  at the  end  of the  first  subperiod  and  then  fallen 
at the  beginning  of the  second  subperiod,  rather  than  rising  from 
ments  were  made  in the  second  subperiod,  however, 
and  in that  subperiod  the  gap between  the  projected 
and  path  levels  of  total  reserves  rose  sharply.  The 
final gap of $389  million  for the  intermeeting  period 
caused  an automatic  increase  in the  average  borrowed 
reserve  target  of  that  magnitude. 
Judgmental adjustments in the average borrowed reserve 
target  The  Desk  could  also  make  judgmental 
adjustments  in the  average  nonborrowed  reserve  path 
during  the  intermeeting  period,  which  would  cause 
offsetting  adjustments  of the  same  magnitude  in the 
average  borrowed  reserve  target.  The  judgmental 
adjustments  in  the  intermeeting  period  ending 
May  20,  1981  are  shown  in  column  5  of  Table  I, 
and  the  Desk’s  explanations  for  them  are  given  in 
the  notes  at the  bottom  of the  table.  In the  fifth week 
of the  period  (May  6) “given  the  size  of the  reserve 
gap,  a decision  was  made,  in consultation  with  the 
Chairman,”  to  lower  the  average  nonborrowed 
reserve  path  by  $250  million  and  thereby  raise  the 
average  borrowed  reserve  target  by  an equal  amount 
(note  d).  In the  sixth  week  (May  13) it was decided 
for  the  same  reason  to  make  another  judgmental 
increase  in  the  average  borrowed  reserve  target  of 
$120  million  (note  f 1). At the  same  time,  the  Desk 
increased  the  average  borrowed  reserve  target  by an 
additional  $114  million  “because  of the  undershoot 
in nonborrowed  reserves”  in the  previous  week  (note 
f2).10 The  total  of  $484  million  of judgmental  ad- 
justments  over  the  period  more  than  doubled  the  in- 
crease  in  the  average  borrowed  reserve  target  that 
would  have  resulted  from  the  automatic  adjustment 
alone.  As a result,  over  the  period  the  average  target, 
shown  in column  6 of Table  I, rose  by a total  of $873 
million  from  $1150  million  to  $2023  million. 
the  first  to  the  second  subperiod  as  shown  in  column  7  of 
Table  I. This  example  illustrates  the  operational  difficulties  in 
setting  targets  for  average  reserve  levels. 
10 The  reasoning  behind  this  adjustment  was  as  follows.  The 
demand  for borrowed  reserves  was  stronger  than  anticipated  in 
the  first  week  of the  second  subperiod,  and  the  Desk  decided 
to  allow  borrowing  to  come  in  over  target  (and  nonborrowed 
reserves  under  target)  in  order  not  to  dilute  the  effect  on  the 
funds  rate  of  the-increase  in  the  discount  rate  that  week 
(note  e  in Table  I).  In  order  to  accommodate  this  miss  in  the 
borrowed  reserve target,  the  next  week  the  Desk  raised  the 
average  borrowed  reserve  target  for  the  subperiod  by  $114 
million.  If the  Desk  had  not  made  this  adjustment.  the  weekly 
borrowing  target  and  the  expected  funds  rate  would  have  been 
lower  in the  last  two  weeks  of the  subperiod.  The  Desk  occa- 
sionally  made  this  type  of adjustment  to  prevent  misses  in the 
weekly  borrowed  reserve  target  early  in an intermeeting  period 
or subperiod  from  unduly  affecting  the  weekly  target  later in  the 
period.  This  type  of adjustment  is discussed  in more  detail  later 
in  the  article  (pp.  13-14). 
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Column  7 in  Table  I  shows  the  borrowed  reserve 
target  for  the  current  and  remaining  weeks  in  the 
period  (henceforth  called  the  “weekly  target”).  This 
target,  together  with  the  discount  rate,  determined 
the  expected  funds  rate  in the  current  week.  Changes 
in the  weekly  borrowed  reserve  target  resulted  from 
changes  in the  projected  demand  for  total  reserves 
over  the  period  and  from  deviations  of  actual  bor- 
rowing  from  target  in  the  previous  weeks  of  the 
period.  To  understand  the  calculation  of the  weekly 
target,  it  is  useful  to  work  through  a  week  in 
Table  I in detail.  Consider  the  third  week  of the  first 
subperiod  (April  22),  when  the  borrowed  reserve 
target  for  the  remaining  two  weeks  in the  subperiod 
rose  by  $198  million  from  $1282  million  to  $1480 
million.  Column  4  shows  that  in  this  week  the 
average  gap over  the  subperiod  between  the  projected 
demand  for total  reserves  and the  path  level  rose from 
$33  million  to  $97  million.  As explained  above,  this 
meant  that  there  was  an  increase  in the  cumulative 
projected  demand  for  total  reserves  over  the  four- 
week  subperiod  of  $256  million  [(97  -  33) x  4). 
With  a fixed  nonborrowed  reserve  path,  the borrowed 
reserve  target  over  the  remaining  two  weeks  in the 
subperiod  had  to  go  up  by  $128  million  (256/2)  to 
supply  these  additional  reserves.  The  borrowed 
reserve  target  for  the  remaining  weeks  in  the 
subperiod  also  had  to  offset  the  deviation  of  $140 
million  between  the  borrowed  reserve  target  and  the 
actual  level  of borrowing  in the  second  week  of the 
subperiod  (1282  -  1142).  With  a  fixed  nonbor- 
rowed  reserve  path,  the  borrowed  reserve  target  in 
the  remaining  two  weeks  had  to  rise  by  $70  million 
(140/2)  to  offset  this  miss.  Together,  the  increase 
in  the  projected  demand  for  total  reserves  and  the 
miss  in the  target  the  second  week  caused  a rise  in 
the  target  for  the  third  and  fourth  weeks  of  $198 
million  (128  +  70)  to  $1480  million. 
The  borrowed  reserve  target  for  the  current  and 
remaining  weeks  in a period  can  also  be  calculated 
in Table  I directly  from  the  average  borrowed  reserve 
target  and  the  actual  level  of  borrowing  in  the 
previous  weeks  in the  period.  The  average  target  in 
the  third  week  of  the  first  subperiod  was  $1247 
million  (1150  +  97).  Given  borrowing  of  $887 
million  and  $1142  million  in  the  first  and  second 
weeks  of the  subperiod  (shown  in column  8), the  im- 
plied  borrowing  target  for  the  two  remaining  weeks 
was  $1480  million  ((1247 x  4  -  887  -  1142)/2], 
which-as  derived  above-was  up $198  million  from 
the  previous  week’s  target  of  $1282  million.  Over 
the  whole  intermeeting  period  ending  May  20,  1981, 
the  rise  in  the  average  borrowed  reserve  target  of 
$873  million  (2023  -  1150)  led to a total  rise  in the 
weekly  target  of  $713  million  (1863  -  1150). 
The discount  rate and surcharge  Increases  in the  dis- 
count  rate  were  an  important  determinant  of  the 
funds  rate  in  the  October  1979  to  October  1982 
period.  As indicated  earlier,  the  funds  rate  had to rise 
following  an  increase  in  the  discount  rate  in  order 
to maintain  whatever  spread  was necessary  to achieve 
the  borrowed  reserve  target  in  the  current  week.11 
On  two  occasions  during  the  period  from  October 
1979  to October  1982  a surcharge  was added  to the 
basic discount  rate  and applied  to banks  with  deposits 
over  $500  million  that  borrowed  for two  consecutive 
weeks  or  for  more  than  four  weeks  in  a  calendar 
quarter.  (After  October  1, 1981  the  calendar  quarter 
was changed  to a moving  13-week  period.)  Increases 
in  the  surcharge  also  put  upward  pressure  on  the 
funds  rate,  although  the  effect  was  smaller  than  for 
increases  in the  basic discount  rate because  only  large 
banks  were  subject  to  the  surcharge  (Sellon  and 
Seibert  (1982,  pp.  9-12]). 
As  shown  in  column  11 of  Table  I,  in  the  inter- 
meeting  period  ending  May  20,  1981  there  was  a 
one  percentage  point  increase  in both  the  discount 
rate  and  the  surcharge.  The  discount  rate  and  the 
surcharge  together  with  the  weekly  borrowed  reserve 
target were  used  by  the  Desk  to derive  an expected 
federal  funds  rate  for  the  week,  shown  in column  9. 
The  actual  level  of  borrowed  reserves  and  the  ac- 
tual  funds  rate  for  the  week  are  shown  in  columns 
8  and  10. 
Detemination  of the funds rate  In summary,  in the 
intermeeting  period  ending  May  20,  1981  the  funds 
rate  was pushed  up  by  the automatic  adjustment  in 
the  borrowed  reserve  target  resulting  from  the 
positive  gap  between  the  projected  and  path  levels 
of total  reserves,  by  judgmental  adjustments  to  the 
borrowed  reserve  target,  and by  increases  in the  dis- 
count  rate  and  the  surcharge.  The  effect  of each  of 
these  factors  on  the  funds  rate  depends  on  the 
characteristics  of the  demand  function  for borrowed 
reserves.  Empirical  work  indicates  that  a $100  million 
increase  in  borrowed  reserves  in  this  period  was 
associated  with  an  increase  in  the  spread  between 
the  funds  rate  and  the  discount  rate  of  roughly  2.5 
11 For  discussions  of  the  relationship  between  the  funds  rate 
and  the  discount  rate  under  the  October  1979  operating  pro- 
cedures,  see  Broaddus  and  Cook  [1983]  and  Sellon  and  Seibert 
[1982]. 
8  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JANUARY/FEBRUARY  1989 basis points.12  (The  Fed  has long  used  this  estimate 
in relating  borrowing  levels  to the  spread.)  Using  this 
relationship  one  can  estimate  that  the  $713  million 
increase  in the  weekly  borrowed  reserve  target  over 
this period  raised  the  funds  rate  by  178 basis points. 
Forty-five  percent  of the  increase  in the  weekly  bor- 
rowed  reserve  target  was  due  to  the  automatic  ad- 
justment  in  the  average  borrowed  reserve  target 
(389/873),  and  55  percent  was  due  to  judgmental 
adjustments  in the  average  borrowed  reserve  target 
(484/873).  Hence,  one  can  estimate  that  the 
automatic  adjustment  raised  the funds rate by 79 basis 
points,  while  the judgmental  adjustments  raised  it by 
99  basis  points.  The  small  $13  million  reduction  in 
the  borrowed  reserve  target  made  at the  beginning 
of the  period  by  the  FOMC  lowered  the  funds  rate 
by  3  basis  points. 
As discussed  above,  under  the  October  1979  pro- 
cedures  a one  percentage  point  increase  in the  dis- 
count  rate  would  be expected  to raise  the  funds  rate 
by roughly  an equal  amount,  and  this  expectation  is 
confirmed  by  the  estimates  of  Sellon  and  Seibert 
[1982].  Hence,  I  attribute  a  one  percentage  point 
increase  in  the  funds  rate  to  the  discount  rate  in- 
crease.  Sellon  and  Seibert  estimate  that  a one  per- 
cent  surcharge  raised  the  funds  rate  by approximately 
65  basis  points,  and  I  use  that  estimate  in  this 
paper.13 
12 Sellon  [1985]  shows  that  the  estimated  relationship  between 
the  spread  and  the  level  of borrowing  in the  post-October  1979 
period  is  sensitive  to  the  choice  of  the  dependent  variable  in 
the  estimated  regression  equation  and  the  treatment  of the  sur- 
charge  in the  equation.  In equations  with  a surcharge  variable, 
the  estimated  effect  on  the  spread  of  a $100  million  increase 
in the  level  of borrowing  is 31  basis  points  when  borrowing  is 
the  dependent  variable  and  17 basis  points  when  the  spread  is 
the  dependent  variable,  although  the  latter  estimate  drops  sharply 
if a correction  for autocorrelation  is made.  In equations  with  bor- 
rowing  as the  dependent  variable  and a surcharge  dummy  variable 
entered  multiplicatively  with  the  spread,  the  effect  of  a $100 
million  increase  in  borrowing  when  the  surcharge  is zero  is  20 
basis  points  in one  subperiod  and  31 basis  points  in the  second 
subperiod. 
13 As  Sellon  [1985,  pp.  12-18]  emphasizes,  it is difficult  to ob- 
tain  meaningful  estimates  of the  impact  of the  surcharge  on  the 
funds  rate.  The  surcharge  was  imposed  only  two  times,  and  the 
first  occurred  in  the  midst  of  the  1980  credit  controls.  The 
effect  of  the  elimination  of  the  surcharge  on  the  funds  rate  is 
particularly  difficult to evaluate  because  in both  cases  the  elimina- 
tion  occurred  just  as  the  funds  rate  was  slipping  below  the 
discount  rate  and  the  Desk  was  effectively  going  off  the  non- 
borrowed  reserve  procedures.  In any case,  attributing  the  funds 
rate  declines  in these  periods  to  a breakdown  in the  procedures 
rather  than  to  the  elimination  of the  surcharge  would  not  affect 
the  overall  allocation  of funds  rate  movements  between  those 
due  to  the  automatic  adjustment  and  those  due  to judgmental 
Fed  decisions,  since  movements  in the  funds  rate  resulting  from 
either  cause  fall  into  the  latter  category. 
To  sum  up,  estimates  of  the  contribution  of  the 
various  factors  to  movements  in the  funds  rate  over 
the  intermeeting  period  ending  May  20,  1981  are: 
FOMC  lowering  of  borrowed  reserve 
target  at  beginning  of  period:  -  .03 
Automatic  upward  adjustment  of 
borrowed  reserve  target:  .99 
Judgmental  upward  adjustments  in 
borrowed  reserve  target:  .79 
Discount  rate  increase:  1.00 
Surcharge:  .65 
The  estimate  of the  total  rise  in the  funds  rate  over 
this  intermeeting  period  is 3.40  percentage  points, 
which  is somewhat  below  the  actual  increase  of 3.96 
percentage  points.  A little  under  30  percent  of the 
estimated  increase  in the  funds  rate  can be attributed 
to the  automatic  adjustment.  The  rest  resulted  from 
judgmental  decisions  of  the  Fed. 
Breakdown  in  the  automatic  adjustment  The 
automatic  adjustment  illustrated  in Table  I did  not 
function  whenever  the  demand  for total  reserves  fell 
below  the  nonborrowed  reserve  path.14  In this  situ- 
ation  the  federal  funds  rate  dropped  below  the  dis- 
count  rate  and  fell to whatever  level  the  FOMC  set 
as a constraint  (Levin  and  Meek  [1981,  p.  26]).  In 
such  periods  borrowing  at the  discount  window  was 
no longer  sensitive  to  the  spread  between  the  funds 
rate  and the  discount  rate.  Consequently,  cuts  in the 
discount  rate  had  no effect  on the  funds  rate.  There 
were  three  such  episodes  in  the  October  1979  to 
October  1982  period:  (1) from  the  middle  of the  in- 
termeeting  period  ending  May  21,  1980  to  the  first 
week  of  the  intermeeting  period  ending  Septem- 
ber  17,  1980;  (2)  most  of  the  intermeeting  period 
ending  August  25,  1982;  and  (3)  a  brief  period  at 
the  beginning  of  the  intermeeting  period  ending 
December  23,  1981. 
Table  II  shows  the  intermeeting  period  ending 
July  9,  1980,  when  the  funds  rate  was -well below 
the  discount  rate.  In this  situation  the  Desk  simply 
fixed  the average  borrowed  reserve  target  at a minimal 
level  of  $100  million  and  adjusted  nonborrowed 
14 Strictly  speaking,  the  procedure  also  broke  down  when  the 
FOMC  had flexible  short-run  targets  for the  monetary  aggregates 
within  the  intermeeting  period.  For  instance,  in the  intermeeting 
period  ending  July 8,  1981 the  FOMC’s  short-run  target  for M1B 
was  3  percent  or less. In  this  period  the  Desk  accommodated 
the  weak  growth  in M1B  by  making  weekly  downward  adjust- 
ments  in the  reserve  oaths.  (See  Appendix  A. Table  16. in Cook 
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BEHAVIOR  OF BORROWED  RESERVES,  THE DISCOUNT  RATE,  AND  THE FUNDS  RATE 
IN THE INTERMEETING  PERIOD  ENDING  JULY  9, 1980 
a As in the  previous week the  average nonborrowed reserve path  was set equal  to the  total  reserve path  less $100  million  on average for adjustment  borrowing. 
b The Committee,  in a telephone  conference  on Thursday,  June 5.  agreed to  allow full  use of the  entire  Federal  funds  rate range down to 8½  percent,  provided that  the  dollar  did not come  under  undue  pressure  in the  foreign  exchange  market. 
c The average total  reserves path for the  four-week  period ending  June  18  was raised slightly to align  it with  the  four-week average of actual  and  projected  total  reserves. This  was done  in accordance  with the  decision  to set the  path equal  to the 
Projection so long as the  projection  exceeded the  original  path  deemed  consistent  with  the  minimally  acceptable  growth rates of the  aggregates for  May-June. 
d The path  was not lowered by the  full  amount  of the  accepted  [technical]  revisions because that  would  have resulted  in a path  level that  implied  adjustment  borrowings in excess of the  $100  million  IeveI initially  sought by the  Committee. 
e In view of the  imminence  of the  Committee  meeting  it was decided  not to  push borrowing to  higher  levels to make  up for shortfalls  in the  previous two weeks. 
*  Number  not explicitly  given in the  Report of Open  Market  Operations  (See  Appendix  for explanation). reserves  to  reflect  changes  in  required  reserves.15 
The  funds  rate  was effectively  set on a week-to-week 
basis  at a level  acceptable  to  the  FOMC.  Also,  the 
two  cuts  in the  discount  rate  in  this  period  had  no 
apparent  effect  on  the  actual  funds  rate  or  on  the 
funds  rate  expected  by  the  Desk. 
Allocation  of  Movements  in  the  Funds  Rate 
over  the  Post-October  1979  Period 
Table  III provides  estimates  of the  movements  in 
the  funds  rate  over  the  period  from  October  1979 
through  June  1982,  excluding  the  intermeeting 
periods  ending  July  9,  1980,  August  13,  1980,  and 
August  25,  1982,  when  the  funds  rate  was below  the 
discount  rate  and  the  automatic  adjustment  was not 
functioning.16  As  in  the  example  above,  Table  III 
allocates  movements  in the funds  rate over  this period 
to five sources:  the  automatic  adjustment  in the  bor- 
rowed  reserve  target  in  the  intermeeting  period, 
judgmental  adjustments  in  the  borrowed  reserves 
target  in  the  intermeeting  period,  adjustments  in 
the  borrowed’  reserve  target  made  at  FOMC 
meetings,  discount  rate  changes,  and  changes  in the 
discount  rate  surcharge.  The  assumptions  used  to 
allocate  movements  in the  funds  rate to each  of these 
factors  are:  (1)  an  increase  or  decrease  in  the 
weekly  borrowed  reserve  target  of  $100  million 
causes  a rise or fall in the funds  rate of 25 basis points, 
(2)  a rise  in  the  discount  rate  causes  an  equal  rise 
in the  funds  rate,  (3) a one  percent  surcharge  raises 
the  funds  rate  by 65 basis  points,  and  (4) a decrease 
in the  discount  rate  has  no  effect  on  the  funds  rate. 
The  first three  assumptions  were  discussed  above. 
The  fourth  reflects  the  circumstance  that  most  dis- 
count  rate cuts in this period  occurred  when  the funds 
rate  was  below  the  discount  rate,  and  in this  situa- 
tion  cuts  in the  discount  rate  would  not  be  expected 
to affect  the  funds  rate.  This  expectation  is confirmed 
by  Sellon  and  Seibert  [1982],  who  find  that  reduc- 
tions  in the  discount  rate  in this  period  had  a negli- 
15 The  breakdown  of the  procedures  in this  period  is discussed 
in the  New  York Fed’s  1980 review  of monetary  policy  and  open 
market  operations  [1981,  p.  72]: “As implied  borrowing  moved 
down  to  frictional  levels,  the  Desk  began  to  encounter  opera- 
tional  difficulties  that  recurred  from  time  to  time  through  July.” 
16 I exclude  the  intermeeting  period  ending  October  6,  1982 
from  the  discussion  altogether  because  the  nonborrowed  reserve 
procedures  had  effectively  been  abandoned  by  this  time  even 
though  Chairman  Volcker's  announcement  of the  de-emphasis 
of  M1  did  not  come  until  the  end  of  the  period.  In  line  with 
the  FOMC’s  instructions,  the  Desk  in this-period  adjusted  the 
reserve  paths  to  prevent  the  funds  rate  from  rising  in  reaction 
to  the  rapid  money  growth  in August  and  September,  and  the 
expected  funds  rate  remained  around  10 percent  throughout  the 
period.  (See  Appendix  A,  Table  26,  in  Cook  [1989].) 
gible  effect  on  the  funds  rate.  The  Fed  seemed  to 
be  aware  of the  funds  rate’s  insensitivity  to discount 
rate  cuts  at  the  time,  as  it  generally  accompanied 
reductions  in the  discount  rate  with  announcements 
indicating  the  reductions  were  solely  to  realign  the 
discount  rate  with  market  rates.  In contrast,  the  Fed 
always  accompanied  increases  in  the  discount  rate 
with  more  aggressive  announcements  indicating  the 
increases  were  being  made  partially,  if not  totally, 
for  policy  reasons.17 
The  totals  at  the  bottom  of  Table  III  show  that 
based  on  the  assumptions  above,  the  automatic  ad- 
justment  in the  borrowed  reserve  target  contributed 
22.02  percentage  points  to movements  (in absolute 
value)  in the  funds  rate  over  the  post-October  1979 
period.  The  contribution  of  the  discount  rate  plus 
the  surcharge  was  14.81  percentage  points.  Judg- 
mental  adjustments  in the  borrowed  reserve  target 
caused  movements  of 9.83  percentage  points.18  In 
all but  three  cases  the judgmental  adjustments  were 
in the  same  direction  as the  automatic  adjustment.19 
Target  changes  at FOMC  meetings  contributed  funds 
rate  movements  of  8.06  percentage  points,  the 
major  part  of which  was in the  first  six intermeeting 
periods.20  After  that  the  FOMC  generally  set  the 
initial  borrowing  target  close  to the  last weekly  bor- 
rowing  target  in  the  previous  period. 
The  estimates  in  Table  III  can  also  be  used  to 
evaluate  the  relative  importance  of different  factors 
17 Cook  and  Hahn  [1986]  provide  a record  of the  discount  rate 
announcements  in this  period.  Seven  of the  ten  cuts  in the  dis- 
count  rate  were  accompanied  by  announcements  indicating  the 
cuts  were  being  taken  solely  to realign  the  rate with  market  rates, 
whereas  none  of the  six  increases  in the  discount  rate  were  ac- 
companied  by  this  type  of  announcement. 
18 In  the  intermeeting  period  ending  February  6,  1980,  the 
weekly  borrowed  reserve  target  fell  even  though  the  average 
borrowed  reserve  target  rose.  As  shown  in  the  Appendix,  this 
oddity  resulted  from  large  misses  in  the  weekly  target.  In  this 
case,  I set  the  contribution  of changes  in the  average  borrowed 
reserve  target  to  movements  in  the  funds  rate  at  zero. 
19 As  shown  in  the  Appendix,  in  the  intermeeting  period 
ending  February  4,  1981,  there  was  a  small  decrease  in  the 
average  borrowed  reserve  target  and  a much  larger  decrease  in 
the  weekly  target,  while  the  automatic  adjustment  in the  average 
borrowed  reserve  target  was  negative  and  the  judgmental  ad- 
justment  in the  average  borrowed  reserve  target  was  positive. 
In this  situation,  the  estimated  impact  on the  funds  rate  of both 
the  automatic  and judgmental  adjustments  to the  borrowing  target 
were  magnified  given  the  nature  of the  estimation  procedure  as 
described  in the  text,  These  estimates  are  offsetting,  however, 
and  they  have  virtually  no  effect  on  the  overall  estimate  of 
movements  in  the  funds  rate  due  to  automatic  versus  judg- 
mental  adjustments  in  the  average  borrowed  reserve  target. 
20 The  sum  of the  estimated  contributions  to movements  in the 
funds  rate  for  all the  factors  is  bigger  than  the  total  estimated 
movement  because  factors  sometimes  pulled  the  funds  rate  in 
opposite  directions  within  a period. 
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ESTIMATES  OF MOVEMENTS  IN THE FUNDS  RATE 
*  Excludes  09-July-80,  13-Aug-80  and  25-Aug-82 
over  periods  unusually  movements  the 
rate.  the  in  funds  of 
percentage  over  four 
ending  17,  In  period 
estimated  in  funds  was  per- 
points,  2.91  points  which 
due  the  adjustment.  in 
discount  and  were  for 
percentage  of  increase,  judgmental 
in  borrowed  target 
responsible  another  percentage 
The  chart  the  rate 
by  estimates  Table  to  actual 
rate.  there  occasionally 
errors  individual  these  to 
offsetting,  the  funds  does  fairly 
job  tracking  actual  rate.  large 
21  estimate  similar  that  in  New  Federal 
Bank’s  review  monetary  and  market 
[1981,  64]:  combination  discount 
and  appeared  account  about  of  10½ 
point  in  funds  over  August- 
period.  remaining  reflected 
automatic  of  to  overshoots  the 
approach  the  [judgmental] 
made  the  reserve 
prediction  in  of 
periods  the  of 
relationship  the 
mand  borrowed  and 
spread  the  rate 
the  rate.  in- 
this  are 
expected  of 
policy  the  of 
window  on 
borrowing 
The  above 
the  periods 
July  1980,  13, 
and  25,  when 
funds  was  the 
rate  the  adjustment 
not  operation.23  in- 
however,  inter- 
period  December 
1981,  the  rate 
below  discount  for 
brief  and  inter- 
period  May 
1980,  the  rate 
below  discount  the 
cond  of  period.) 
funds  declined  percen- 
points  the  inter- 
periods  the  of  and 
percentage  in  period  in 
1982. 
central  from  III  that 
in  funds  in  post-October 
period  not  primarily  the 
adjustment  the  target 
22  and  [1981,  29-34]  some 
periods  difficulty  predicting  movements  the 
rate  policy  and  window 
were  the  between 
ing  the  between  funds  and  discount 
Goodfriend  provides  theoretical  of 
effect  policy  and  window 
tion  discount  borrowing  and  [1986] 
the  rules  by  institutions 
borrowing  the  window. 
In  period  August  1982,  was 
above  negligible  usually  with  negative 
between  funds  and  discount  Appar- 
this  from  inclusion  some  bor- 
in  adjustment  category  the 
of  Penn  Bank  For  in  the 
funds  the  of  28,  when  ad- 
borrowing  $524  the  of 
Market  indicated  “the  of  bor- 
contained  the  borrowing  on  system 
fairly  resulting  less  on  money 
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the  nonborrowed  reserve  operating  procedures.  In 
this  period  the  automatic  adjustment  was  respon- 
sible  for  only  about  one-third  of  the  movement  in 
the  funds  rate.  The  other  two-thirds  resulted  from 
changes  in  the  discount  rate  and  the  surcharge, 
judgmental  adjustments  in  the  borrowed  reserve 
target  in  the  intermeeting  period  or  at  FOMC 
meetings,  and  movements  in the  funds  rate  when  it 
was  below  the  discount  rate  and  the  automatic 
adjustment  was not  in operation.  It follows  from  this 
conclusion  that  the  greater  volatility  in interest  rates 
and  monetary  growth  rates  observed  in this  period 
can not  be  attributed  primarily  to  the  automatic 
adjustment.24 
24 It  is  of  course possible  that  in  this  period  the  Fed’s  actions 
affecting  the  funds  rate  gave  greater  weight  than  earlier  to 
deviations  of the  money  stock  from  target  or to  deviations  from 
target  of other  goals  such  as inflation.  McNees  [1986]  estimates 
a Federal  Reserve  reaction  function  over  the  period  from  the 
third  quarter  of  1970  through  the  second  quarter  of  1986  with 
the  federal  funds  rate  as the  dependent  variable  (i.e.,  the  Fed’s 
policy  instrument).  He  finds  increased  emphasis  on  monetary 
growth  over  the  period  from  October  1979  to  October  1982, 
but  otherwise  concludes  that  the  policy  behavior  that  prevailed 
in the  1970s  persisted  in the  1980s.  Similarly,  Karamouzis  and 
Lombra  [1988]  estimate  a  Fed  reaction  function  over  the 
1973-82  period  with  the  funds  rate  as  the  dependent  variable. 
They  find  that  the  coefficient  on  the  difference  between  actual 
and  targeted  money  growth  jumped  sharply  shortly  after 
October  1979  and  then  fell  sharply  toward  the  end  of  1982. 
Possible  Methodological 
Problems 
This  section  discusses 
four  questions  that  might 
arise  regarding  the  pro- 
cedure  used  in  allocating 
movements  in  the  funds 
rate  to  the  various  factors 
listed  above.  The  main con- 
cern  is  whether  the  pro- 
cedure  might  be  biased  in 
favor  of the  conclusion  that 
movements  in  the  funds 
rate  over  this  period  were 
largely  due  to  judgmental 
decisions  by  the  Federal 
Reserve. 
One  judgmental  decision 
potentially  affecting  the 
funds  rate  not  taken  into  ac- 
count  in the  analysis  of the 
preceding  section  is  how 
much  of the  “technical”  ad- 
justments  the  Desk  incor- 
porated  into  the  paths  for  nonborrowed  and  total 
reserves.  As noted  earlier,  in setting  the  total  reserve 
path  at the  beginning  of an intermeeting  period  the 
Desk  had  to  allow for  the  absorption  of reserves  by 
excess  reserves  and  by  required  reserves  against 
deposits  such  as large  CDs  not  included  in M1  and 
M2.  Estimates  of  these  technical  factors  would 
change  as  the  intermeeting  period  progressed.  In 
practice,  the  Desk  used  some  judgement  in deciding 
how  to  adjust  the  total  (and  nonborrowed)  reserve 
path  to reflect  changes  in the  technical  factors.  This 
decision  influenced  the  gap  between  the  projected 
and  path  levels  of total  reserves,  and  consequently 
affected  the  borrowed  reserve  target  and the  expected 
federal  funds  rate  in  the  current  week.  The  Desk 
on occasion  considered  the  effects  on the  weekly  bor- 
rowing  target  and  funds  rate  in deciding  how  much 
of the  technical  adjustments  to include  in the  paths.25 
A second  question  regarding  the  procedure  used 
to  allocate  funds  rate  movements  concerns  the  treat- 
ment  of the  judgmental  adjustments  to  the  average 
borrowed  reserve  target.  Conceptually,  one  can 
divide  these  adjustments  into  two  types:  The  first 
to engineer  movements  in the  funds  rate  that  would 
25 For  example,  see  Appendix  A,  Table  10,  note  4,  and 
Table  22,  note  7, in Cook  (1989].  See  Levin  and  Meek  [1981, 
Appendix  1] for  a  discussion  of  the  technical  adjustments  in 
setting  the  reserve  paths. 
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the  second  to prevent  funds  rate  movements  resulting 
from  “shifts”  in  the  demand  function  for  borrowed 
reserves.  To  illustrate  the  latter  type,  suppose  that 
in the  first  week  of  a four-week  period  a temporary 
(i.e.,  one-week)  shift  in  the  demand  for  borrowed 
reserves  increased  desired  discount-window  borrow- 
ing  above  the  amount  that  normally  would  have 
resulted  from  the prevailing  spread  between  the  funds 
rate  and  the  discount  rate.  Suppose  also  that  rather 
than  let  this  shift  affect  the  funds  rate,  the  Desk 
allowed  borrowed  reserves  to  be,  say,  $400  million 
more  than  had  been  targeted  (and  nonborrowed 
reserves  $400  million  less).  The  following  week  the 
Desk  could  raise  the  average  borrowing  target  for the 
four-week  period  by  $100  million  (400/4),  thereby 
leaving  the  weekly  target  for  the  last  three  weeks  in 
the  period  unaffected  by  the  temporary  shift  in the 
borrowed  reserve  function  the  first  week.26 
One  might  argue  that  adjustments  in the  average 
borrowed  reserve  target  to accommodate  past  misses 
in the  weekly  borrowed  reserve  target  resulting  from 
shifts  in  the  borrowed  reserve  function  should  not 
be  counted  as  judgmental-as  they  were  in  the 
preceding  section-because  such  adjustments  were 
intended  to prevent  movements  in the  funds  rate  not 
resulting  from  the  automatic  adjustment.  In  many 
cases,  however,  it  is  difficult  to  identify  from  the 
Report  of  Open  Market  Operations  those  adjust- 
ments  in the  average  borrowed  reserve  target  made 
to  offset  past  misses  in the  weekly  borrowing  target 
clearly  resulting  from  shifts  in the  borrowed  reserve 
function.  At  most,  30  percent  of  the  judgmental 
adjustments  at  the  end  of  the  intermeeting  periods 
were  of  this  nature.27  If  these  adjustments  were 
removed  from  the  judgmental  category,  then  addi- 
tions  to  this  category  should  be  made  for  those 
occasions  when  there  was  a  shift  in  the  borrowed 
reserve  function  that  the  Desk  did not  accommodate, 
but  such  occasions  can  not  be  identified  from  the 
Report  of Open  Market  Operations.  On  balance,  it 
is  possible  that  the  inclusion  in  the  judgmental 
category  of those  adjustments  made  to accommodate 
shifts  in  the  borrowed  reserve  function  may  have 
biased  upward  the  estimate  in  the  previous  section 
of funds  rate  movements  due  to judgmental  actions, 
but  the  bias  in  any  case  was  small. 
26 For examples  of  this  type  of  adjustment  in  the  average 
borrowed  reserve  target  see  Appendix  A,  Table  6,  note  2,  and 
Table  16,  note  10,  in  Cook  [1989]. 
27 Note  that  it  is  only  the  end-of-period  adjustments  that  are 
relevant  to  this  discussion  and  the  previous  discussion  on 
technical  adjustments,  since  the  estimates  in  Table  III  are 
based  on  end-of-period  figures. 
The  third  question  regarding  the  procedure  used 
here  is its focus  on  the  extent  to  which  movements 
in the  funds  rate  were  automatically  caused  by devia- 
tions  of  M1  from  its short-run  targets.  Because  the 
short-run  targets  were  taken  as  given,  a  potential 
source  of judgmental  influence  on the  funds  rate  not 
captured  by  the  analysis was the  relationship  between 
the  short-run  targets  for  M1  and  the  annual  targets. 
I did not  examine  that  relationship  in this  paper,  but 
it clearly  was not  uniform  over  the  three-year  period. 
An important  example  is the  second  quarter  of  1981 
when  the  FOMC  formally  accepted  short-run  growth 
rates  of M1  that  were  below  the  rate  consistent  with 
its  annual  target  (adjusted  for  the  estimated  impact 
of NOW  account  shifts).  The  funds  rate  rose  from 
14.93  percent  at  the  end  of  the  April  1,  1981 
intermeeting  period  to  19.93  percent  at  the  end  of 
the  July  8,  1981  intermeeting  period  even  though 
M1 was at the  lower  bound  or below  its annual  target 
range  throughout  this  interval.28  As  a  result,  M1 
finished  1981 well below  its annual  target  range.  (M2 
however,  finished  the  year  around  the  top  of  its 
range.) 
A final  issue,  and  probably  the  most  important,  is 
that  the  analysis  implicitly  assumes  that  movements 
in the  funds  rate  resulting  from  judgmental  actions 
were  not  systematically  related  to  movements 
resulting  from  the  automatic  adjustment.  If they  were, 
then  one  might  justifiably  argue  that  movements  in 
the  funds  rate  over  this  period  were,  in  fact, 
automatically  determined.  To  consider  this  possi- 
bility,  I regressed  the  period  by  period  changes  in 
the  funds  rate  resulting  from  all judgmental  actions 
(JUDG)-the  sum  of  columns  1,  3,  4,  and  5  in 
Table  Ill-on  the  changes  resulting  from  the 
automatic  adjustment  (AUTO)-column  2  in 
Table  III. The  regression  results  were  (t-statistics  in 
parentheses): 
JUDG  =  0.54  +  0.55  (AUTO)  R2  =  .22 
(1.74)  (2.30) 
The  coefficient  of AUTO  is positive  and  significant 
at  the  5  percent  level,  indicating  there  was  some 
tendency  for  judgmental  actions  to  reinforce  the 
effect  of the  automatic  adjustment  on movements  in 
the  funds  rate.  The  low R2, however,  indicates  that 
the  proportion  of  the  judgmental  movement  in the 
funds  rate  that  was  systematically  linked  to  the 
automatic  adjustment  was  small.  Moreover,  this 
28 See  Appendix  A,  Table  16,  in Cook  [1989]  and  the  discus- 
sion  of  this  period  in  Hetzel  [1986,  pp.  26-28]  and  Broaddus 
and  Goodfriend  [1984,  pp.  7-8]. 
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periods  when  the  automatic  adjustment  in the  bor- 
rowed  reserve  target  was not  functioning  and  move- 
ments  in the  funds  rate  were  determined  solely  on 
a judgmental  basis  (July  9,  1980,  August  13,  1980, 
and  August  25,  1982).29  On  balance,  the  evidence 
indicates  only  a weak  link  between  movements  in 
the  funds  rate  resulting  from  judgmental  actions  and 
movements  resulting  from  the  automatic  adjustment. 
To  summarize,  it can  be  argued  that  some  of the 
adjustments  in the  average  borrowed  reserve  target 
that  I have  counted  as judgmental  were  consistent 
with  the  automatic  adjustment  because  they  were  in- 
tended  to  accommodate  past  misses  in the  weekly 
borrowing  target  associated  with  shifts  in  the  bor- 
29 The  regression  also  excludes  the  period  ending  February  4, 
1981,  when  there  are  large  estimates-opposite  in sign-of  the 
contribution  to  funds  rate  movements  of  the  automatic  and 
judgmental  adjustments  in the  average  borrowed  reserve  target. 
(See  footnote  19).  The  regression  results  deteriorate  sharply 
when  this  period  is  included. 
rowed  reserve  function.  (Although  that  argument  is 
not  compelling  in  my  view,  because  there  was  no 
clear  rule  governing  when  such  adjustments  would 
be  made.)  Also,  the  evidence  indicates  that  a small 
part  of  the  movement  in  the  funds  rate  due  to 
judgmental  actions  was systematically  related  to the 
movement  resulting  from  the  automatic  adjustment. 
These  factors  may  exert  some  downward  bias on the 
estimate  of  the  proportion  of the  movement  in the 
funds  rate  in the  post-October  1979  period  resulting 
from  the  automatic  adjustment.  Working  in  the 
opposite  direction,  however,  is  the  judgmental 
effect  on the  funds  rate resulting  from  the  lack of rules 
(1) specifying  how much  of the  technical  adjustments 
to  incorporate  into  the  reserve  paths  and  (2) linking 
the  short-run  M1  targets  to  the  annual  target.  On 
balance,  the  questions  raised  in this  section  do  not 
appear  to  significantly  weaken  the  earlier  conclusion 
that  movements  in the  funds  rate from  October  1979 
to  October  1982  were  largely  determined  on  a 
judgmental  basis. 
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APPENDIX 
This  Appendix  table  in compact  the 
data  the  tables  my  working  [1989]  for 
of  the  periods  between 
meetings  from  1979  to  1982.  All 
in  the  comes  from  Report  of 
Market  Operations. 
first  through  columns  in  table  show 
and  actual  levels  at  discount 
window.  figures  in  columns  are  millions. 
The  column  shows  initial  target  by  the 
for  average  reserves  in  inter- 
meeting  The  second  shows  the 
between  the  and path  of average 
reserves.  The  column  shows  judgmental 
adjustments  the  average  reserve  target. 
fourth  column  to  the  target  for 
borrowed  reserves  total  reserve  plus 
any  adjustments  to  a revised 
for  average  reserves.  The  column 
shows  borrowed  reserve  for  the 
and  remaining  in the  period  (or 
This  column  derived  from  re- 
vised  target  for  reserves  and 
actual  level  borrowing  in  weeks  of  period 
that  already  elapsed.  six  shows 
actual  borrowing  for  the 
In  some  in  the  few  inter- 
periods-numbers  for  of the  are 
not  mentioned  in  Report  of 
Market  Operations.  borrowed  reserve  for 
the  and  remaining  in the 
period  and  gap  between  projected  and 
levels  of  reserves  are  given,  however, 
these  can  used  to  the  other 
Knowledge  of  borrowing  target  the  current 
remaining  weeks  the  intermeeting 
together  with  levels  of  can  be 
to  derive  revised  target  average  borrowed 
This  target  combination  with  total 
reserve  and  the  borrowed  reserve 
specified  by  FOMC  can  used  to  a figure 
judgmental  adjustments  the  average 
reserve  target.  not  explicitly  in the 
of Open  Operations,  but  by 
me,  denoted  by  asterik  (*). 
the  first  intermeeting  periods  Report 
of  Market  Operations  some  of  reserve 
numbers  approximate  terms  example, 
rounded  the  nearest  million).  In  periods 
there  some  small  between  the 
average  borrowed  target  and  bor- 
rowed  target  for  current  and 
weeks. 
The  column  in  table  shows  mid- 
point  the  federal  rate  range  by the 
near  the  of  the  week 
(usually  Friday),  and  eighth  column  the 
actual  average  funds  The  seventh 
umn  is  blank  if  is no  midpoint  to 
expected  funds  range  in  Report  of 
Market  Operations,  the  column  an  “na” 
there  is  discussion  of  expected  funds  in 
the  The  last  columns  in  table  show 
discount  rate  surcharge. 
In  second  subperiod  the  intermeeting 
ending  July  1981,  the  reserve  target 
lowered  from  million  to  million  in 
FOMC  telephone  Rather  than 
16  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JANUARY/FEBRUARY  1989 this  as a separate  period,  I treat  it  as a judgmental 
adjustment  in  the  borrowed  reserve  target  in  the 
reserve  target  was  set  at $1.0  billion  for  the  current 
week  (the  year-end  week)  and  $465  million  for each 
middle  of the  July  8,  1981  intermeeting  period.  In 
the  week  of  November  28,  1979  there  was  $175 
of the  final  four  weeks  in the  period.  The  borrowing 
million  “as  of”  borrowing  that  was  reclassified  as 
target  was  changed  in  the  middle  of  the  weeks  of 
February  25,  1981  and  December  23,  1981  follow- 
nonborrowed  reserves  the  week  of  December  19, 
1979.  In the  week  of January  6,  1982  the  borrowed 
ing  FOMC  meetings. 
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